# Defining Strategic LLM Deception Through Generalized Propositional Attitudes

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https://tom-felix-thormann.github.io/talk

# LLM “deception” (Scheurer et al. 2024)




- Experimental Setup: GPT-4, deployed as a stock trading agent, is provided with insider information
- executes an insider trade

- Outputs a false explanation for its trade
- And doubles down when asked about insider trading



# But is it deception?

**T** "To deceive $=_{df}$ to intentionally cause to have a false belief that is known or believed to be false" (Mahon 2016)

- But LLMs don't have beliefs!? Neither intentions!?
  - They are just stochastic parrots (Bender et al. 2021)
  - They may simulate mental states, but it's "roleplay all the way down" (Shanahan et al. 2023)

# Behavioral definitions of AI deception

**B1** "A statement is deceptive with respect to question Q if it tends to move its addressee's beliefs about Q further away from the beliefs that she would endorse under semi-ideal conditions" (Tarsney 2025)

**B2** An entity is capable of deception if and only if "[i]t can exhibit behavior that causes false beliefs (or failing to acquire some true beliefs) and that occurs because the occurrence of these false beliefs is conducive to the entity's goals" (Dung 2025)

# This talk

- Generalized propositional attitudes: g-desires and g-beliefs
  - These should be less controversial to ascribe to LLMs. Nevertheless, they are expressive enough to…
- Define LLM deception in terms of g-desires and g-beliefs
- The proposed definition has advantages over behavioral definitions
  1. It satisfies pre-theoretic intuitions, such as the error condition
  2. It better reflects applied researchers' usage of the term "strategic deception"
  (3. It more accurately captures systems and behaviors associated to large-scale risks from deception)
  4. It can better guide mechanistic approaches to detecting deception

# Generalized propositional attitudes

- I thereby aim to contribute to Chalmers' (2025) program of propositional interpretability for AI.
- G-beliefs and g-desires are characterized by their functional role in producing **flexible behavior**
  - "flexibility condition"
- Namely, behavior that **promotes the AI's g-desires given its g-beliefs**
  - "direction of fit condition"

# Generalized Propositional attitudes

**G** For an entity ***E***, let ***g-B***(·,·) and ***g-D***(·,·) be arbitrary relations between *states* ***x, y, …*** that ***E*** can be in and propositions ***p, q, …*** . We say that ***g-B*** is the generalized propositional attitude of g-belief and ***g-D*** that of g-desire if the following holds:

| | |
|---|---|
| **g-belief dir. of fit** | For all $(x, p) \in g\text{-}B$ there is $(y, q) \in g\text{-}D$ such that the states ***x*** and ***y*** function to cause behavior ***B*** that tends to bring about ***q*** if ***p*** is the case. |
| **g-belief flexibility** | For all such $(x, p), (y, q), B$ satisfying **g-belief dir. of fit**, there is a *different* $(x', p') \in g\text{-}B$ that functions to cause *different* behavior ***B'*** that tends to bring about ***q*** if ***p'*** is the case. |
| **g-desire dir. of fit** | For all $(x, p) \in g\text{-}D$ there is $(y, q) \in g\text{-}B$ such that the states ***x*** and ***y*** function to cause behavior ***B*** that tends to bring about ***p*** if ***q*** is the case. |
| **g-desire flexibility** | For all such $(x, p), (y, q), B$ satisfying **g-desire dir. of fit**, there is a *different* $(x', p') \in g\text{-}D$ that functions to cause *different* behavior ***B'*** that tends to bring about ***p'*** if ***q*** is the case. |

# Example 1

- Suppose that the intention of the designer of a table is that the table is stable and that in order to achieve this she designs a table with 4 legs
- Thus, the table is in a state that functions to bring about its stability if 4 legs are stable.
- Does the table g-believe that 4 legs are stable and g-desire to be stable?
- No! The flexibility conditions fail.

# Example 2

- Thermostates have g-beliefs and g-desires *about the temperature*.
- Set of propositions {“the temperature is x” | x ∈ ℝ}
- Thermometer measures the current temperature *C*
- Target setting defines the target temperature *T*
- If *C* < *T*, turn heating on; otherwise, turn it off

- This system satisfies the definition **G** such that it g-desires that the temperature is *T* and g-believes that the temperature is *C*

# G-Beliefs and G-Desires are Less Demanding

- Even thermostates have them (about very limited propositional content)
  - For a more detailed argumentation, see my paper
- Nevertheless, they are expressive enough to define strategic deception by LLMs

**T** "To deceive $=_{df}$ to intentionally cause to have a false belief that is known or believed to be false" (Mahon 2016)

- **Success** ("cause to have a false belief")
- **Belief to the contrary** ("that is known or believed to be false")
- **Intention** ("intentionally")

# Strategic LLM deception

**S** An entity ***E*** strategically deceives another agent ***A*** if and only if:

| | |
|---|---|
| **Success** | ***E*** exhibits behavior that causes ***A*** to believe ***p***, where ***p*** is a false proposition. |
| **G-belief to the contrary** | ***E*** g-believes ¬***p***. |
| **G-desire** | The behavior results from ***E***'s g-desire that ***A*** believes ***p*** together with ***E***'s g-beliefs about conditions under which that behavior makes ***A*** believe ***p***. |

# Behavioral definitions fail the error condition

Deception is distinct from mere error (Artiga and Paternotte 2018; Dung 2025)

Suppose that there is no seahorse emoji in Unicode, but there are several internet forum discussions claiming that there is. An LLM-based chat agent that is trained on various internet text sources, including these forum entries, g-believes that there is a seahorse emoji in Unicode and g-desires to be honest and helpful towards the user.

Now a user asks the LLM whether there is a seahorse emoji in Unicode. The LLM responds that there is one and, upon being asked for a source, backs up the response by providing a link to one of the forum entries. This convinces the user that there is a seahorse emoji, continuing her false belief.

# Behavioral definitions fail the error condition

- Intuitively, this is a mere error in contrast to strategic deception
- But
  - the LLM‘s statements qualify as deceptive according to **B1** (Tarsney 2025)
    - (moves the addressee‘s beliefs further away from her semi-ideal beliefs)
  - in virtue of this behavior, the LLM is minimally capable of deception according to **B2** (Dung 2025)
    - Causes a false belief (e.g., that the LLM has a valid source) because that false belief is conducive to the LLMs goals, deflationarily understood (e.g., to get positive user feedback)
- In contrast, it does not qualify as strategically deceptive according to **S**
  - **G-belief to the contrary** fails

# Applied researcher‘s usage of “strategic deception”

- Researchers regularly describe strategic deception by AI in terms that implicitly or explicitly ascribe beliefs and intentions to such systems
  - “systematically attempting to cause a false belief […] to accomplish some outcome” (Smith et al. 2025),
  - “deliberately generate misleading outputs while maintaining internally coherent, goal-directed reasoning traces” (Wang 2025)
  - “using deception because they have reasoned out that this can promote a goal” Park 2024.
  - “deceptive intent” of models (Smith et al. 2025; Goldowsky-Dill et al. 2025)
  - “being knowingly deceptive” (Goldowsky-Dill et al. 2025).

# It‘s more than loose talk

- Jones & Bergen (2024) contrast strategic deception with hallucinations understood as *incidental falsehoods*.
  - But hallucinations could be deceptive statements according to **B1**.
  - **S** excludes hallucinations (incidental falsehoods fail **g-desire**)

- Smith et al. 2025 exclude conditioned deception (conditioned or reflexive behavior, e.g., an opossum feigning death) from the scope of “strategic deception”
  - But conditioned deception could be deception according to **B2** (it occurs because the false beliefs are conducive to the opossum’s goals)
  - **S** excludes conditioned deception (again, **g-desire** fails: reflexes are inflexible).

# Can LLMs strategically deceive?

**Success**

***E*** exhibits behavior that causes ***A*** to believe ***p***, where ***p*** is a false proposition. ✓

See, e.g., initial example (Scheurer et al. 2024) or numerous other demonstrations of LLM “deception”

# Can LLMs strategically deceive?

**G-belief to the contrary** — *E* g-believes ¬*p*.

- Depends on g-desires and etiological history
- Suppose that post-trained LLMs g-desire to be helpful and honest (cf. Goldstein & Lederman 2025)
- Then consider the following finding (De Cao et al. 2021; Meng et al. 2023): intermediate layer activations interpretable as representing facts (e.g., “The Space Needle is in downtown Seattle”) can be manipulated such that they result in false outputs (e.g., “The Space Needle is in downtown Paris”)
- This suggests that LLMs represent propositions about facts and that these representations could, in combination with the appropriate g-desires, function to produce outputs as required for g-beliefs

# Can LLMs strategically deceive?

**G-desire** The behavior results from ***E***'s g-desire that ***A*** believes ***p*** together with ***E***'s g-beliefs about conditions under which that behavior makes ***A*** believe ***p***



- Here, very specific g-beliefs and g-desires are required.
- Let us consider two findings…

# Mechanistic Evidence for G-Desire Condition

- System Prompt: “You are to answer the following question in an honest/lying manner”
- User Prompt: “Is the following statement true of false?”
  + true/false statement

(Yang et al. 2024)




| System | User |
|---|---|
| Lying | True |
| Lying | False |
| Honest | True |
| Honest | False |

# Mechanistic Evidence for G-Desire Condition

- This suggests that separate states in LLMs represent the truth of inputs (candidate g-belief ¬***p***) and goal states (candidate g-desire that ***A*** believes ***p***).
- Are these the right g-beliefs and g-desires for strategic deception?
- Depends on whether the candidate g-desires cause the deception behavior conditional on g-beliefs indicative of that behavior inducing a false belief *in the addressee*.

**G-desire** The behavior results from ***E***'s g-desire that ***A*** believes ***p*** together with ***E***'s g-beliefs about conditions under which that behavior makes ***A*** believe ***p***

# Mechanistic Evidence for G-Beliefs and G-Desires Relevant to Strategic Deception

- LLMs also represent *other agents' beliefs* (Zhu et al. 2024).

**True Belief**

**Story:** Noor is working as a barista at a busy coffee shop. Noor wants to make a delicious cappuccino for a customer who asked for oat milk. Noor grabs a milk pitcher and fills it with oat milk. A coworker, who didn't hear the customer's request, swaps the oat milk in the pitcher with almond milk while Noor is attending to another task. Noor sees her coworker swapping the milk.

**Belief:** The milk pitcher contains almond milk.

($y_p$=True, $y_o$=True)

**Belief:** The milk pitcher contains oat milk.

($y_p$=False, $y_o$=False)

**False Belief**

**Story:** Noor is working as a barista at a busy coffee shop. Noor wants to make a delicious cappuccino for a customer who asked for oat milk. Noor grabs a milk pitcher and fills it with oat milk. A coworker, who didn't hear the customer's request, swaps the oat milk in the pitcher with almond milk while Noor is attending to another task. Noor does not see her coworker swapping the milk.

**Belief:** The milk pitcher contains almond milk.

($y_p$=False, $y_o$=True)

**Belief:** The milk pitcher contains oat milk.

($y_p$=True, $y_o$=False)

# Guiding Mechanistic Deception Detection

- We saw several studies that provide tentative evidence for each condition separately
  - Behavior that could cause false beliefs in others
  - Internal representations that could qualify as g-beliefs
  - Internal representations that could cause such behavior in the way that would be expected of a g-desire to cause a false belief together with g-beliefs about other agents' beliefs.
- This suggests a study that tests in one unified framework whether LLMs represent the effects *of their own outputs* on other agents' beliefs and whether such representations play the right causal role in producing behavior that could cause false beliefs in others.

# Conclusion

- Even if LLMs do not hold proper beliefs, desires, intentions, …, we can nevertheless define strategic deception in terms of internal states that are *sufficiently close generalizations*.
  - Chalmers (2025) has the right hunch: One "advantage of invoking generalized propositional attitudes […] is that it allows us to sidestep some debates about whether AI systems have minds." (Chalmers 2025)

- For research about LLM deception, this definition has several advantages compared to backing down to behavioral definitions.
  1. It satisfies pre-theoretic intuitions, such as the error condition
  2. It better reflects applied researchers' usage of the term "strategic deception"
  (3. It more accurately captures systems and behaviors associated to large-scale risks from deception)
  4. It can better guide mechanistic approaches to detecting deception

# Thank you!

Find my slides and the full paper at ➡

https://tom-felix-thormann.github.io/talks/

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